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Safety strategies in the process and other industries depend ultimately on how much the
owners and operators decide should be spent on protection systems to protect workers and
the  public from potential plant hazards. An important input to decisions of this sort is the
value of life, which needs to be assessed in a valid manner so that safety decisions can
be  made properly. A key reference point for decisions on safety investment decisions in
the  UK is a 1999 study on the “value of a prevented fatality” (VPF), which employs a two-
injury chained model that has been shown previously by the present authors to possess
internal inconsistencies. The 1999 study made extensive use of utility functions to interpret
survey data, and it is this feature that is explored in this paper. It will be explained here how
different forms of utility function of the Exponential family can produce the same ﬁgure for
an  intermediate parameter in the calculation of the VPF from the two-injury chained model.
Exponential utility functions are, however, unlikely to provide a realistic representation if
their calculated risk-aversions need to be negative or zero in order to match survey data,
which would imply an incautious attitude amongst those taking decisions on safety. The
use  of an incompletely speciﬁed wealth threshold in the utility modelling is explored in the
light of a proposal by the authors of the 1999 study that a second utility function can be
used  to determine the individual’s utility when his wealth lies below the threshold, which
constitutes the lower limit of validity of the ﬁrst utility function. The proposition is shown
to  be untenable. The results presented in this paper raise further concerns about the lack of
validity of the 1999 study on which the UK VPF is based and hence on the safety decisions
that  have been made in consequence.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1.  Introduction
Safety decisions in many  industrial situations, particularly
in high-hazard industries such as nuclear, oil and gas and
chemicals, depend ultimately on a consideration of how much
should be spent on safety measures to protect workers and
the public from potential hazards. In the UK the legal require-
ment is to do all that is reasonably practicable to ensure the
health and safety of workers and the public. This requirement
means that it is necessary to compare the sacriﬁce (cost, time
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 117 331 5830; fax: +44 117 954 5208.
E-mail addresses: pjt3.michaelmas@gmail.com, philip.thomas@bristol.ac.uk (P.J. Thomas).
and trouble) of implementing measures to improve safety with
the reduction in risks to those that might suffer harm (HSE,
2014). Thus the amount it is reasonable to spend on safety
measures may be judged as a trade-off between the beneﬁt
that the system confers in terms of improved safety and the
loss of beneﬁt brought about by the costs of paying for those
measures. In line with the Kaldor–Hicks compensation prin-
ciple (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939), it is customary to assign the
cost and hence a notional reduction in wealth to those being
protected, even though they will rarely have to meet the bill in
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2015.07.002
0957-5820/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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practice. Utility functions are then used to characterise the fall
in beneﬁt these people experience as a result of their assumed
reduction in wealth.
To compare the outlay on implementation with the costs
in terms of loss of life and other detriments through a cost-
beneﬁt analysis (CBA), it is fundamentally necessary to place
a monetary value on human life. The “value of a prevented
fatality” (VPF) derives from one such valuation exercise. A
ﬁgure for the VPF is published annually by the UK Govern-
ment’s Department for Transport (2013) and this is used also
by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Ofﬁce for
Nuclear Regulation (ONR) in developing new safety regula-
tions and determining whether safety measures meet the
legal requirements—though it should be emphasised that the
latter are the responsibility of those carrying out the work
activity.
It is clear that ensuring the VPF is a true reﬂection of what
should be spent is very important and to this end various
methods of eliciting the VPF from social and economic sur-
veys have been attempted. The VPF that is currently used in
the UK is based on a study by Carthy et al. (1999), which uses a
two-injury chained method, whereby individuals are asked to
consider two serious injuries, with injury X more  severe than
injury W.  The individual is asked to estimate the maximum
acceptable price (MAP) he would pay to avert the speciﬁed
injury and the minimum acceptable compensation (MAC) he
would take as compensation for enduring the injury. The anal-
ysis of the data makes very extensive use of utility functions
in an attempt to ﬁnd the amount it is notionally reasonable to
pay for a safety measure that will reduce by one the expected
number of premature deaths in a large population, given that
those deaths are associated with a speciﬁed hazard. This sum
is deemed to be the VPF.
This approach to deriving a ﬁgure for the VPF originated
in the transport sector but the concept is now applied much
more  widely. After tracing the history of the development of
the UK VPF ﬁgure, Wolff and Orr (2009) concluded that:
“it appears that the Carthy study (Carthy et al., 1999) is now
the primary source of VPF ﬁgures, adjusted for inﬂation and
changes in GDP.”
A 2011 report for the Department for Transport (DfT), with
authors in common with the Carthy study, recommended
“against any early new full scale WTP  [willingness to pay]
study” (Spackman et al., 2011). Thus the survey conducted by
Carthy et al. of 167 people in 1997 (Carthy et al., 1999) remains
the evidential base for the VPF used by the Government, reg-
ulators and many  industries in the UK today, including the
process and nuclear industries. It is obviously of crucial impor-
tance, therefore, that the Carthy study should be soundly
based.
Updated for increases in GDP per head, the VPF is assumed
to be the same for all people in the UK, irrespective of age
or gender. While this might be a dubious assumption (see
Nathwani et al., 1997, 2008; Pandey and Nathwani, 2003;
Pandey et al., 2006; Sunstein, 2004a,b; Thomas et al., 2006a,
2006b, 2010a, Thomas and Vaughan, 2013), the VPF is used
extensively in the UK.
We have questioned in earlier papers (Thomas and
Vaughan, 2015a,b) the methodology used by Carthy et al,
showing that their work contained serious ﬂaws. Using the
Carthy authors’ own data it was demonstrated that the
method was invalid in that it failed to estimate consistently a
key parameter determining the size of the VPF. This param-
eter, mXi, is the individual’s marginal rate of substitution
between his wealth and his probability of not suffering injury
X. The Carthy study’s data allow estimation of mXi in two dif-
ferent ways, giving m(1)
Xi
and m(2)
Xi
respectively. These values
should, of course, be equal for the method to be sound, but
they are, in fact, very different and, indeed, barely correlated.
Thus the two-injury chained method has been falsiﬁed in the
sense used by Popper (1934). Indeed, whilst still defending
their methodology, the Carthy co-authors have admitted to
methodological problems:
“there is a deﬁnite and seemingly systematic divergence
between direct and indirect estimates which is illustrated
by the comparison between m(2)
Xi
and m(1)
Xi
” (Chilton et al.,
2015).
Moreover, Thomas and Vaughan (2015b) found that many
of the defences put forward by the Carthy authors in an effort
to justify their methodology were ﬂawed or mistaken and so
concluded that their attempt to support the use of the method-
ology was not tenable.
A sub-group of those involved in the ﬁrst defence published
a second attempt at a justiﬁcation of the Carthy study (Jones-
Lee and Loomes, 2015). While not disputing the failure of the
two-injury chained method in the fundamental validity test
just mentioned, they raised two main points as a follow on to
Thomas and Vaughan (2015b), concerning
(1) the form the utility function for wealth should take if the
individual puts his maximum acceptable price (MAP) for
averting the injury as high or higher than the minimum
acceptable compensation (MAC)  he would countenance to
endure the injury;
(2) whether it is legitimate to deduce a wealth for the respon-
dent from his stated MAP and MAC.
In considering these issues, it should be emphasised at
the outset that they are both subsidiary to the previously
accepted objection of systematic divergence detailed above,
which is sufﬁcient on its own to invalidate the two-injury
chained method on which the UK VPF rests. We may conclude
immediately, therefore, that the points now raised by Jones-
Lee and Loomes are insufﬁciently important to affect let alone
overrule the major criticism we put forward in our ﬁrst paper.
Therefore we reiterate our belief that the VPF derived by Carthy
et al. and used for the past 16 years in the UK is not satisfac-
tory for use in making safety decisions as it is not based on a
sound analysis.
Nevertheless it must be recognised that the VPF ﬁgure used
in the UK since 1999 rests squarely on the value produced by
the Carthy study. It is thus very important that the attempted
second defence of that study by Jones-Lee and Loomes should
not be regarded as cover for continuing to use an invalid ﬁgure.
Much of the argument in Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015) con-
cerned the use of utility functions and it is the purpose of this
paper to investigate how the various utility functions may be
used legitimately. Indeed the issues raised by Jones-Lee and
Loomes (2015) are of both theoretical and practical interest.
It is intriguing that different utility functions from the same
Exponential family can give the same result for a key inter-
mediate parameter in the calculation of the VPF when the
two-injury chained method is used, namely the marginal rate
of substitution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of wealth
under injury k. The paper will explain why this is so.
Theoretically interesting results are also produced through
considering the proposal of Jones-Lee and Loomes that a
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second utility function can be used to determine the indi-
vidual’s utility when his wealth lies below the threshold of
validity of a ﬁrst utility function. It will be shown that this
procedure introduces a distorting and unrealistic kink “at the
join” between the two  utility functions, the avoidance of which
requires that the wealth threshold be zero or negligibly small.
This rules out the suggestion of Jones-Lee and Loomes that
two utility functions can be used, one valid above the wealth
threshold and the other below. Setting the threshold at a value
higher than zero would mean that the individual’s utility of
wealth would show a sharp and discontinuous rise at the
wealth threshold, characteristic only of the very ﬁrst incre-
ment of wealth. It would suggest that the individual does not
start to value his wealth at all until it reaches the threshold,
which is an unrealistic model of human behaviour unless the
threshold level is negligibly small. Hence a single utility func-
tion is needed if all positive wealths are to be covered when
the ﬁrst utility function is one of the three types used in the
Carthy study that allow a determination of the individual’s
wealth, namely the Constrained Power, the Logarithmic and
the Negative Inverse.
The use of a single utility function, or, equivalently, ﬁx-
ing the wealth threshold at zero, leads to the very low implied
individual wealths associated with the Carthy study discussed
in Thomas and Vaughan (2015a), now accepted by Chilton et
al. (2015) to be “ridiculously low”. Consistency in the size of
the wealth threshold, set by Carthy et al. at zero for the Nega-
tive Exponential utility function, constituted the rationale for
the assumption of Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) that the zero
threshold speciﬁed for the Negative Exponential utility func-
tion would carry across to the other three utility functions
used in the Carthy study: Constrained Power, Logarithmic and
Negative Inverse. However the avoidance of the unrealistic
kink “at the join” between two utility functions, as just dis-
cussed, provides another reason why the wealth threshold
must be zero.
The additional inconsistency noted previously with the
Carthy study remains unchanged, whereby each utility func-
tion gives two different average wealths for the same sample
population, one when injury X is considered and a different
one for injury W.  This is a clear nonsense.
Further interesting results are derived if, purely for the pur-
poses of argument and illustration, it is decided to set aside
the ﬁnding that the wealth threshold for each person should
be zero or negligibly small if a utility function is to be used in
characterising decisions on safety measures. The two, incon-
sistent and low implied average wealths found previously
turn out to be entirely unchanged when people’s behaviour
is modelled using the Constrained Power utility function. It is,
moreover, possible to use random variable analysis to deduce
plausible average wealths under the Logarithmic and Negative
Inverse utility functions. Low average wealths are produced
once more,  and the infeasible split is exacerbated between
the two average wealths deduced for the same set of peo-
ple under the two injuries, X and W,  considered in the Carthy
study.
The intention of this paper is to lay out a clear expla-
nation of the issues raised by Jones-Lee and Loomes before
refuting them in the hope that the results may be of inter-
est and value to the wider safety community. Section 2 will
put the use of utility functions in safety analysis into context
and then explain the technical issues raised by Jones-Lee and
Loomes.
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Fig. 1 – Example of a utility function: (Negative–Negative
utility function, Ui = − exp (−ˇiwi); ˇi = 10−5).
2.  The  use  of  utility  functions  in  safety
decision  making
2.1.  General  properties  of  utility  functions
Utility functions embody the concept that a person will value
successive increments of his wealth differently, with the ﬁrst
increment normally worth more  to him than later increments.
Fig. 1 shows as an example a Negative Exponential utility func-
tion with parameter, ˇi, set to 10−5 for illustrative purposes
(see Eq. (3) below for the deﬁnition of the curve). The fact that
the person’s utility of wealth is negative is held not to have sig-
niﬁcance because in utility theory it is utility differences that
matter rather than the absolute value of utility. The impor-
tant thing to observe is that the worth the person sets on his
wealth, that is to say his utility, rises as his wealth increases,
but not in a linear fashion. He values successive increments
less.
A calculation of the appropriate amount to spend on a
safety measure to protect human life will often rely on the
use of utility functions. These can be applied to characterise
the fall in beneﬁt experienced by the people being protected
by a safety system as a result of their wealth being notion-
ally reduced to the level it would have been if the burden
of payment had actually fallen on them, in line with the
Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle.
Utility functions are normally expected to be differentiable,
which facilitates analysis, and it is argued in Thomas (2010)
that of the differentiable functions, only the Power family of
utility functions can offer a realistic model of human decision
making. This is because only the Power family stipulates that
the person’s risk-aversion stays constant during the process of
comparing each pair of alternative wealth outcomes. Indeed
the Power utility function is widely used by economists and
actuaries (Boadway and Bruce, 1984), and has the basic form:
Ui (wi) = w1−εii (1)
where Ui(.) is the utility function, wi, is the wealth of individual,
i, while εi is his dimensionless risk-aversion. This is deﬁned for
any type of utility function as:
εi = −wi
d2Ui
dw2
i
÷ dUi
dwi
(2)
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For example, the Logarithmic utility function recom-
mended by the U.K. Treasury (2011) is a limiting form of the
Power utility function where the risk-aversion is unity: εi = 1.0.
It is normal to assume that a positive risk-aversion, indicat-
ing caution, will be in force when decisions of consequence are
being taken, e.g., when human life is at risk. This implies a util-
ity function that is increasing in wealth but concave—showing
a tendency to level out (although there may be no asymptotic
top level). Higher risk-aversions will normally result in more
cautious decisions (although there are limits; see Thomas
et al., 2010a,b; Thomas and Jones, 2010c; Thomas, 2013 for a
discussion of these).
Other differentiable functions of roughly the same shape
are sometimes suggested as serviceable for representing util-
ity. One such is the Negative Exponential utility function
illustrated in Fig. 1:
Ui (wi) = −e−ˇiwi (3)
where ˇi is a constant that is characteristic of the individual,
with ˇi > 0 being the canonical form. This produces a utility
that is always negative, but increases in a concave fashion
from –1.0 to 0.0 as wealth, wi, increases from zero.
The risk-aversion for individual, i, operating to this utility
function is:
εi = ˇiwi (4)
which, for ˇi > 0, is positive for any positive wealth, wi, indicat-
ing a cautious decision-maker.
The Positive Exponential was discussed as a utility function
by Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015):
Ui (wi) = eˇiwi (5)
with ˇi > 0 producing the canonical form. This returns a value
of 1 at wi = 0 and increases exponentially and without limit
as wealth goes up. The risk-aversion for individual, i, is now:
εi = −ˇiwi (6)
which, for ˇi > 0, will be negative for any positive wealth, indi-
cating a risk-seeking decision maker.
The reversal of the sign for risk-aversion suggests that the
Positive Exponential utility function, as deﬁned by Eq. (5), can
be regarded in a sense as the opposite of the Negative Expo-
nential utility function deﬁned by Eq. (3).
2.2.  The  effect  of  MAP  being  equal  or  higher  than  MAC
on the  utility  functions  used  in  the  1999  study
Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) pointed out that all 4 utility
functions used by the Carthy study suffered invalidating prob-
lems when MAP  ≤ MAC.  (Besides the Negative Exponential
utility function, the Carthy study tabulated results from the
Constrained Power, Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility
functions. These utility functions are deﬁned and discussed
further in Section 7 below.) Nevertheless it was found that a
Negative Exponential utility function, when pushed beyond
the limits of its applicability, could reproduce the common
results that the Carthy authors decided to write across all
utility functions for the 30% of cases where MAP ≤ MAC.
These cases are listed in the document, “Individual Responses
& VOSLS–PEG Study”, HSE/Peg/Nov 1997/SC, supplied by
Table 1 – Pairs of Exponential utility functions that apply
for ranges of MAC to MAP  ratio, cki = yki/xki.
1< cki < ∞ cki = 1 0 < cki < 1
Negative Exponential NNEx NZEx NPEx
Positive Exponential PNEx PZEx PPEx
Professor Jones-Lee, which contains the data used in the
Carthy study.
The two-injury chained method used in the 1999 study
implies that the value of ˇi may vary, leading in some cases to
ˇi = 0 and in others to ˇi < 0, as well as the more  normal ˇi > 0.
Some interesting and important links between the behaviour
of the two basic Exponential utility functions then emerge, as
indicated by Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015).
In their response to Thomas and Vaughan (2015a), Chilton
et al. (2015) complained that:
“the Negative Exponential utility function produces a com-
pletely different result from the one that we  derived and
reported in the data that we sent to them.” [their italics]
but this statement was refuted comprehensively in Table 1 of
Thomas and Vaughan (2015b). However, Jones-Lee and Loomes
(2015) have now clariﬁed that they themselves were using a
Positive Exponential utility function, of the form Ui (wi) = eˇiwi
with ˇi > 0, to cover cases where MAP < MAC and a Linear util-
ity function, of the form Ui (wi) = giwi + hi with gi > 0, when
MAP = MAC.
On this basis, Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015) describe the
use of the Negative Exponential to derive their results as a
“fundamental error”. In fact, as Jones-Lee and Loomes admit,
the Positive Exponential and Linear utility functions produce
exactly the same answers as found using the Negative Expo-
nential utility function when operated outside its normal
range. It is thus objectively impossible to divine from the tab-
ulated results which of the alternative utility functions were
used.
Nevertheless the point is of interest. Both the Positive Expo-
nential and the Negative Exponential utility function belong
to the family of Exponential utility functions, and this paper
will explore in Sections 3–6 how different utility functions in
the same Exponential family can give the same result for a key
intermediate parameter in the calculation of the VPF using the
two-injury chained method. This parameter is the marginal
rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of
wealth.
Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015) have now further made it clear
that the Carthy study was advocating and employing a switch
between different utility functions when MAP  ≥ MAC,  even if
the labels in the tables of results in the Carthy study were
left bearing the name of the default utility function applied
to the rest of the cohort for whom MAP < MAC.  By contrast
Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) had achieved the same ﬁgures
by assuming a movement  between different modes of the Neg-
ative Exponential utility function, thus ensuring continuity of
utility at least in the case of the Negative Exponential utility
function.
Thomas and Vaughan were, however, puzzled as to the
justiﬁcation for writing the results produced by the Negative
Exponential utility function when pushed beyond its nor-
mal  limits in place of results from the Constrained Power,
the Logarithmic and the Negative Inverse utility functions.
This raises the question as to whether it is acceptable to
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make the change to the Positive Exponential utility function
from even its closest relative, the Negative Exponential util-
ity function. The paper will show such a leap to be a dubious
proposition.
2.3.  Deducing  the  wealth  of  respondents
2.3.1.  The  status  of  the  wealth  threshold
Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015) advocate a further switch
between utility functions, this time between the nominal util-
ity function, taken to be valid above individual i’s wealth
threshold, ˇ(i) ≥ 0, and a second, auxiliary utility function to
cover wealths less than ˇ(i). (The wealth threshold, ˇ(i), is not
related to the parameter, ˇi, used to characterise the Exponen-
tial utility function, but the notation follows that used in the
Carthy study.)
Jones-Lee and Loomes suggest that the second utility func-
tion can be ﬁtted underneath the ﬁrst. Invoking this auxiliary
utility function might then get around the fact, pointed out in
Thomas and Vaughan (2015b), that any strictly positive wealth
threshold would leave the individual’s utility undeﬁned for
wealths below ˇ(i). If the argument could be sustained that
a separate utility function can be invoked to cover individual
i’s wealth, wi, when it falls below the threshold, wi < ˇ(i), then
what Jones-Lee and Loomes describe as the “ridiculously low
implied levels of wealth” that are an embarrassment for the
two-injury chained method would be transformed into wealth
differences only. Discrepancies amongst wealth differences
might then be considered less damaging to the validity of the
two-injury chained method.
The paper will therefore examine (in Section 7) the proposal
that a second utility function valid for wealths up to the wealth
threshold, ˇ(i), may be joined onto the ﬁrst utility function that
covers the higher wealths. It will be shown that the proposi-
tion is untenable. The inclusion of a wealth threshold in the
utility function precludes a meaningful deﬁnition of utility for
any wealth less than the threshold, a situation that must be
unrealistic unless ˇ(i) → 0.
2.3.2.  Examination  of  the  situation  when  a  non-zero
wealth  threshold  is  assumed  to  be  possible
In Section 8, it will be assumed, for the sake of argument, that
it is possible to include an incompletely deﬁned wealth thresh-
old, ˇ(i), in the deﬁnition of the utility function, as advocated
by Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015).
It will be shown that, even in this case, the hope of avoid-
ing the “ridiculously low implied levels of wealth” turns out
to be vain. It will be shown that it is still possible to deduce
the wealth of each individual in the case of the Constrained
Power utility, and hence the average wealth in the cohort for
comparison with the UK average wealth at the time. Moreover
the values are unaltered from those reported in Thomas and
Vaughan (2015a), about 5% of the wealth of the average UK
adult at the time of the Carthy study.
In the cases of the Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility
functions, it is possible, by employing a random variable anal-
ysis, to make a reasonable estimate of the expected average
wealth of the cohort, a ﬁgure suitable once again for compar-
ison processes. The resultant low values and discrepancies
demonstrate the invalidity of the two-injury chained model
even if a case for retaining the wealth threshold could be sus-
tained (which is not possible).
3.  The  use  of  the  Negative  Exponential
utility  function  in  the  two-injury  chained
method
3.1.  Relating  the  MAC  to  MAP  ratio,  cki,  to  the
parameter,  ˇi,  that  deﬁnes  the  shape  of  the  Negative
Exponential  utility  function
Appendix A relates the individual’s starting utility of wealth
to his utilities after paying the maximum acceptable price
(MAP), xki, to avert the injury and after receiving his minimum
acceptable compensation (MAC), yki, for enduring the injury.
The following equation is derived:
Ui (wi0 − xki) +  Ui (wi0 + yki) = 2Ui (wi0) k = W,  X (A.8)
where wi0 is the individual’s starting wealth.
Substituting from Eq. (3) into Eq. (A.8) gives an expression
relevant to the Negative Exponential utility function:
e−ˇiwi0eˇixki + e−ˇiwi0e−ˇiyki = 2e−ˇiwi0 (7)
Multiplying throughout by eˇiwi0 gives
eˇixki + e−ˇiyki = 2 (8)
which implies that all further results will apply irrespective
of the individual’s starting wealth, wi0. Now deﬁne cki as the
individual’s MAC to MAP ratio:
cki =
yki
xki
(9)
where cki ≥ 0. Eq. (8) now becomes:
eˇixki + e−ˇickixki = eˇixki + (e−ˇixki )cki = 2 (10)
Using the further substitution,
ki = eˇixki (11)
yields:
ki − 2 +
1

cki
ki
= g (ki, cki) = 0 (12)
where, the function, g (ki, cki), is as deﬁned above. It may
be noted that cki = 1 turns Eq. (12) into the quadratic equa-
tion, 2
ki
− 2ki + 1 = 0, which has ki = 1 as its sole solution.
This knowledge facilitates an iterative solution for ki at two
values of cki, one just below unity and the other marginally
above. These solutions provide starting points for the Method
of Referred Derivatives (Thomas, 1999), which takes advantage
of the analytic continuity of the function, g (ki, cki), to ﬁnd ki
in terms of cki over the range 0< cki < ∞.  See Fig. 2, which shows
a smooth curve passing through the point (1, 1) with asymp-
totic values ki → 0 as cki → 0 and ki → 2 as cki→ ∞.  Thus we
may write
ki = F (cki) = F
(
yki
xki
)
(13)
where, F (yki/xki) is given graphically in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 – Plot of ki versus cki with the regions of ˇi marked
up: positive, negative and zero.
It follows from ki = eˇixki that
ˇi =
ln ki
xki
(14)
Since the MAP,  xki, can be expected to be greater than zero,
ˇi will take the sign of ln ki. The curve of ki vs. cki shown in
Fig. 2, taken in conjunction with Eq. (14), implies the following
conditions:
0 < cki < 1 ⇒ ki < 1 ⇒ ˇi < 0
cki = 1 ⇒ ki = 1 ⇒ ˇi = 0
1 < cki < ∞ ⇒ ki > 1 ⇒ ˇi > 0
(15)
The conditions on ˇi have been marked up on Fig. 2.
3.2.  The  marginal  rate  of  substitution,  mki,  of
non-injury  probability  in  place  of  wealth,  wi,  under  the
two-injury,  chained  method
Substituting from Eq. (3) into Eq. (A.9) gives the injury offset,
aki, for individual, i, and injury, k, for the Negative Exponential
utility function as:
aki = −e−ˇiwi0 + e−ˇi(wi0−xki) = e−ˇiwi0
(
eˇixki − 1
)
= −Ui (wi0) (ki − 1)
(16)
Meanwhile, differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to wi gives,
at wi = wi0:
dUi
dwi
= ˇie−ˇiwi0 = −
ln ki
xki
Ui (wi0) (17)
where, Eqs. (3) and (14) have been used in the second step.
The marginal rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury prob-
ability in place of wealth, wi, is given by Eq. (A.10), introduced
in Appendix A:
mki =
aki
dUi
dwi
k = W,  X (A.10)
Hence, substituting from Eqs. (16) and (17) into Eq. (A.10)
gives the marginal rate of substitution of non-injury probabil-
ity in place of wealth, mki, as
mki =
ki − 1
ln ki
xki (18)
with k taking the value, W or X, depending on which injury is
under consideration. Using Eq. (13), we  may express this as:
mki =
F
(
yki
xki
)
− 1
ln F
(
yki
xki
) xki k = W,  X (19)
3.3.  Properties  of  the  3  categories  of  the  Negative
Exponential  utility  function
As shown in condition set (15) and as marked on Fig. 2,
three regions may be deﬁned for ˇi where, ˇi < 0, ˇi = 0 and
ˇi > 0. These demarcate 3 different categories of the Negative
Exponential utility function. The ﬁrst category, where ˇi > 0,
embodies two negatives: the minus  sign immediately after
the equals sign in Eq. (3) and the negative exponent. This, the
canonical form, may be named the Negative-Negative Expo-
nential (NNEx) utility function in consequence.
The second form, with ˇi = 0, retains the minus  sign imme-
diately after the equals sign in Eq. (3) but has a zero exponent
and so may be characterised as the Negative-Zero Exponen-
tial (NZEx) utility function. The third form, when ˇi < 0, keeps
the minus  sign immediately after the equals sign in Eq. (3)
but has a positive exponent. This form will be called the
Negative–Positive Exponential (NPEx) utility function.
3.3.1.  The  Negative–Negative  Exponential  (NNEx)  utility
function  (ˇi >  0)
From condition set (15), values of cki in the range 1< cki < ∞ will
lead to ˇi > 0, leading to NNEx utility function, given by
Ui (wi) = −e−ˇiwi ˇi > 0 (20)
which produces a utility that is always negative, but increases
in a concave fashion from −1 to 0 as wealth, wi, increases from
0. The risk-aversion, εi, for individual, i, is positive, indicating
caution, a caution that increases with wealth:
εi = ˇiwi ˇi > 0 (21)
3.3.2.  The  Negative–Positive  Exponential  (NPEx)  utility
function  (ˇi <  0)
From condition set (15), values of cki in the range 0 < cki < 1.0
will lead to ˇi < 0 and so to the NPEx utility function, deﬁned
by
Ui (wi) = −e−ˇiwi ˇi < 0 (22)
This might be regarded as an anti-materialist utility func-
tion, since it models a person who prefers less wealth to more.
(We shall suspend judgement at this stage on whether or not
this is a realistic model of human choice concerning safety
measures.)
The risk-aversion for individual, i, is negative indicating
that the person is risk-seeking, a tendency that increases with
wealth:
εi = ˇiwi ˇi < 0 (23)
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3.3.3.  Properties  of  the  Negative–Zero  Exponential  (NZEx)
utility  function  (ˇi =  0)
From condition set (15), a unity value of cki: cki = 1 will lead to
ˇi = 0, and hence the NZEx utility function, which is given by:
Ui (wi) = −e−ˇiwi |ˇi=0 = −1 (24)
As indicated by Fig. 2, it is the limiting form of both the
NNEx utility function and the NPEx utility function as ˇi → 0
and ki → 1. It models the behaviour of someone who is indif-
ferent to wealth.
From Eq. (4), the risk-aversion is zero, a feature that nor-
mally indicates a risk-neutral individual:
εi = 0 (25)
Applying l’Hôpital’s rule to Eq. (18), shows that the marginal
rate of substitution of non-injury probability in place of
wealth, mki, obeys
mki → xki as cki → 1 (26)
where ki → 1 as cki → 1.
3.4.  Summary  of  the  properties  of  Negative
Exponential  utility  functions
The Negative–Negative Exponential (NNEx) utility function is
associated with a MAC to MAP  ratio that lies in the range:
1< cki < ∞.  This leads to a strictly positive value for the beta
parameter governing the shape of the utility function: ˇi > 0.
The utility function is increasing but concave and the risk-
aversion is positive, indicating cautious behaviour.
The Negative-Positive Exponential (NPEx) utility function
is produced when the MAC to MAP  ratio lies in the range:
0 < cki < 1. This leads to the beta parameter being strictly neg-
ative, ˇi < 0, causing the utility function to be decreasing but
concave. The risk-aversion is negative, a property that nor-
mally indicates risk-seeking behaviour.
The Negative–Zero Exponential (NZEx) utility function
results from a MAC to MAP  ratio of unity: cki = 1. This leads
to a zero value for the beta parameter: ˇi = 0. The utility func-
tion is then a horizontal straight line. The risk-aversion is zero,
something that normally indicates risk-neutrality.
Discussion of the validity of the NPEx and NZEx utility func-
tions as models for human behaviour will be deferred until the
end of Section 6.
4.  The  use  of  the  Positive  Exponential
utility  function  in  the  two-injury  chained
method
4.1.  Relating  the  MAC  to  MAP  ratio,  cki,  to  the
parameter,  ˇi,  deﬁning  the  shape  of  the  Positive
Exponential  utility  function
Substituting from Eq. (5) into Eq. (A.8) gives
eˇiwi0e−ˇixki + eˇiwi0eˇiyki = 2eˇiwi0 (27)
which may be reduced to
e−ˇixki + eˇiyki = 2 (28)
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Fig. 3 – Plot of  ki vs. cki with the regions of ˇi marked up:
positive, negative and zero.
by multiplying throughout by e−ˇiwi0 . Substituting from Eq. (9),
namely cki = yki/xki, into Eq. (27) gives:
e−ˇixki + eˇickixki = e−ˇixki + (eˇixki )cki = 2 (29)
Applying the further substitution,
 ki = e−ˇixki (30)
yields:
 ki − 2 +
1
 
cki
ki
= 0 (31)
Eq. (31) is of the same form as Eq. (12), and so its solutions
will reproduce those shown in Fig. 2. Hence
 ki = F (cki) = F
(
yki
xki
)
(32)
However, since now, from Eq. (30)
ˇi = −
ln  ki
xki
(33)
the regions where ˇi < 0 and ˇi > 0 will be reversed. See Fig. 3.
Hence
0 < cki < 1 ⇒  ki < 1 ⇒ ˇi > 0
cki = 1 ⇒  ki = 1 ⇒ ˇi = 0
1 < cki < ∞ ⇒  ki > 1 ⇒ ˇi < 0
(34)
Substituting from Eq. (5) into Eq. (A.9) gives the injury offset,
aki, for individual, i, and injury, k, for the Positive Exponential
utility function as:
aki = eˇiwi0 − eˇi(wi0−xki) = eˇiwi0
(
1 − e−ˇixki
)
= −Ui (wi0) ( ki − 1)
(35)
Meanwhile, differentiating Eq. (5) with respect to wi gives,
at wi = wi0:
dUi
dwi
= ˇieˇiwi0 = −
ln  ki
xki
Ui (wi0) (36)
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Since  ki = exp (−ˇixki) implies ˇi = − ln  ki/xki it follows
that substituting from Eqs. (35) and (36) into Eq. (A.10) gives
the marginal rate of substitution of non-injury probability in
place of wealth, mki, as
mki =
 ki − 1
ln  ki
xki (37)
where, k may take the value W or X. Using Eq. (32) we may
write
mki =
F
(
yki
xki
)
− 1
ln F
(
yki
xki
) xki k = W,  X (38)
Comparing Eqs. (19) and (38), it is clear that the marginal
rate of substitution of non-injury probability in place of
wealth, mki, will always be the same for the Positive Expo-
nential utility function as for the Negative Exponential utility
function for any combination of MAP  and MAC, (xki, yki).
4.2.  Properties  of  the  3  categories  of  the  Positive
Exponential  utility  function
Allowing for the 3 cases where, ˇi > 0, ˇi = 0 and ˇi < 0, the
Positive Exponential utility function may also be split into 3
separate categories. The ﬁrst, canonical form, where, ˇi > 0,
embodies two positives: the implied plus sign immediately
after the equals sign in Eq. (5) and the positive exponent.
This form will be speciﬁed as the Positive–Positive Exponential
(PPEx) utility function.
The second form, with ˇi = 0, retains the implied plus sign
immediately after the equals sign in Eq. (5) but has a zero
exponent. This will be characterised as the Positive-Zero Expo-
nential (PZEx) utility function. The third form, when ˇi < 0,
keeps the implied plus sign immediately after the equals sign
in Eq. (5) but has a negative exponent. This form will be called
the Positive–Negative Exponential (PNEx) utility function.
4.2.1.  The  Positive–Positive  Exponential  (PPEx)  utility
function  (ˇi >  0)
From condition set (34), values of cki in the range 0 < cki < 1.0
mean that ˇi > 0, which leads to the PPEx utility function,
which has the form:
Ui (wi) = eˇiwi ˇi > 0 (39)
This produces a utility that is always positive, but increases
in a convex fashion from (0, 1) with wealth, wi. The risk-
aversion for individual, i, is negative and decreasing with
wealth, indicating he will become ever more  risk-seeking as
he gets richer:
εi = −ˇiwi ˇi > 0 (40)
4.2.2.  The  Positive–Negative  Exponential  (PNEx)  utility
function  (ˇi <  0)
From condition set (34), values of cki in the range 1< cki < ∞
mean that ˇi < 0, which leads to the PNEx utility function,
which has the form:
Ui (wi) = eˇiwi ˇi < 0 (41)
Like the NPEx utility function, this may be regarded as
an anti-materialist utility function, since it returns a unity
utility at zero wealth and then declines, thus modelling a per-
son who prefers less wealth to more.  We shall once again
suspend judgement on the realism of this utility function until
later.
The risk-aversion for individual, i, is positive and increasing
with wealth, indicating an increasingly risk-averse person as
he gets wealthier:
εi = −ˇiwi ˇi < 0 (42)
4.2.3.  The  Positive–Zero  Exponential  (PZEx)  utility
function  (ˇi =  0)
From condition set (34), a unity value for cki: cki = 1.0 means
that ˇi = 0, which implies the PNEx utility function, with the
form:
Ui (wi) = eˇiwi |ˇi=0 = 1 (43)
As indicated by Fig. 3, it is the limiting form of both the
PPEx utility function and the PNEx utility function as  ki → 1
and so ˇi → 0. Like the NZEx utility function, the PZEx models
the behaviour of someone who is indifferent to wealth. The
risk-aversion for individual, i, is zero, indicating a risk-neutral
person:
εi = 0 (44)
Applying l’Hôpital’s rule to Eq. (37) shows that the marginal
rate of substitution of non-injury probability in place of
wealth, mki, obeys
mki → xki as cki → 1 (45)
where,  ki → 1 as cki → 1.
4.3.  Summary  of  the  properties  of  Positive  Exponential
utility  functions
The Positive–Positive Exponential (PPEx) utility function is
associated with a MAC to MAP ratio that lies in the range:
0 < cki < 1. This leads to a strictly positive value for the beta
parameter governing the shape of the utility function: ˇi > 0.
The utility function is convex and increasing. The risk-
aversion is negative, indicating risk-seeking behaviour.
The Positive–Negative Exponential (PNEx) utility function
is produced when the MAC to MAP ratio lies in the range:
1< cki < ∞.  This leads to the beta parameter being strictly neg-
ative, ˇi < 0, causing the utility function to be convex but
decreasing. The risk-aversion is positive, which normally indi-
cates cautious behaviour.
The Positive-Zero Exponential (PZEx) utility function
results from a MAC to MAP ratio of unity: cki = 1. This leads
to a zero value for the beta parameter: ˇi = 0. The utility func-
tion is then a horizontal straight line. The risk-aversion is zero,
which normally indicates risk-neutrality.
The ultimate validity or otherwise of the Positive Exponen-
tial utility functions as models for human decisions on safety
will be discussed at the end of in Section 6.
5.  Similarities  and  differences  between  the
various  Exponential  utility  functions
Fig. 4 illustrates two groups of utility functions: the three Neg-
ative Exponential utility functions, namely NNEx, NZEx and
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Fig. 4 – Exponential utility functions with
∣∣ˇi∣∣ = 1 × 10−5
Upper half: Positive–Positive, Positive–Zero,
Positive–Negative. Lower half: Negative–Negative,
Negative–Zero, Negative–Positive.
NPEx, and the three Positive Exponential utility functions:
PPEx, PZEx and PNEx. The deﬁning parameter, ˇi, conforms
in all cases to
|ˇi| = 1 × 10−5 (46)
a value chosen for illustrative purposes. It is clear that the one
group is the mirror image  of the other.
As pointed out in Section 4.1, a comparison of Eqs. (19) and
(38) shows that the marginal rate of substitution of non-injury
probability in place of wealth, mki, will always be the same for
the Positive Exponential utility function as for the Negative
Exponential utility function for any combination of MAP  and
MAC, (xki, yki). This duality lies behind many  of the comments
contained in Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015).
Interestingly, despite those authors inveighing there
against the calculational framework for mki developed for a
Negative Exponential utility function being employed to cal-
culate mki for a Positive Exponential utility function, it was
suggested in the Carthy study that just such a route might be
used:
“with the positive exponential form, for any non-fatal
injury I, mI is given by simply letting xˆ and yˆ “swap  places”
in the formulae for the negative exponential case”
In fact it is shown in Appendix C to this paper that it is
indeed possible to compute mki under the Positive Exponen-
tial utility function by replacing yki by xki and xki by yki in the
formula for mki under the Negative Exponential, but there is
no need to make this transposition, as the unmodiﬁed formula
will give the same result. This interesting outcome is a neces-
sary consequence of the model used in the two-injury chained
method.
The value of the MAC to MAP  ratio, cki = yki/xki, determines
which of the three Negative Exponential utility functions
applies and which of the three Positive Exponential utility
functions applies. Table 1 shows the relationship between cat-
egory of Exponential utility function and MAC to MAP ratio,
cki.
The question now arises does either the NPEx or the PPEx
utility function have greater validity than the other? While the
risk-seeking nature of both militates against a convincing case
for validity in the context of safety decisions, it can be argued
that the NPEx utility function has a stronger claim by virtue
of being closer to the NNEx utility function, taken to be one
of the default utility functions used in the Carthy study. The
nature of this closeness will be discussed in the next section.
6.  Continuity  of  utility:  modelling  the
individual’s  behaviour  through  moving  from
one  Exponential  utility  function  to  another
utility function  selected  from  the  Exponential
family
Assume the decision has been taken to model the behaviour of
a cohort of respondents using a utility function from the Neg-
ative Exponential group. Referring to the bottom half of Fig. 4,
suppose that someone’s MAC, yki, is slightly greater than his
MAP, xki. His decision-making is thus currently modelled, rea-
sonably, using a NNEx utility function, which we  may regard as
the default utility function. Now imagine that this individual
is considering edging his MAC down so that it will be slightly
lower than his MAP. On the way, he considers the possibility
that his MAC and MAP  should be equal: yki = xki, implying cki = 1.
Modelling this situation using the NZEx utility function will
mean that a seamless transfer from the NNEX utility function
will have taken place, and this will give him a slightly lower
utility of wealth as a result.
Now assume he lowers his MAC slightly more,  so that it
lies a little below his MAP.  Now yki < xki and so cki < 1. This will
transfer him to the NPEx utility function, and will give him a
utility of wealth that is slightly lower again.
The whole process, NNEx → NZEx → NPEx, will result in a
gradual and continuous decline in his utility of wealth.
[Movements among yki > xki, yki = xki and yki < xki leading
to cki > 1, cki = 1 and cki < 1 respectively, cannot be considered
improbable in view of the evidence that 50 out of the 167
respondents in the Carthy survey set cki ≤ 1 when consider-
ing either injury W or the more  severe injury X.  Of these 50
people, nearly half, 23, chose a different option for cki under
injury W from the one they chose under injury X.]
Examine now what happens when utility functions taken
from the top half as well as the bottom half of Fig. 4 are applied,
viz selections may be made from the Positive Exponential
group as well as the Negative Exponential group. Let the per-
son’s starting behaviour, with yki > xki, be modelled fairly by  a
NNEx utility function as previously. Moreover, when he moves
to yki = xki, let his behaviour be modelled, as before, by a NZEx
utility function, so that his utility of wealth drops slightly. Now
let him make his MAC slightly smaller than his MAP,  so that
now yki < xki and cki = (yki/xki) < 1. If his behaviour is now mod-
elled by a PPEx utility function, his utility of wealth will shoot
up in a dramatic fashion, analogously to ﬁnding a ladder in
the snakes-and-ladders board game. For example, if he pos-
sesses wealth of £70,000, he will suddenly ﬁnd that he has
more  utility under the PPEx than £70 bn would have afforded
him under his original, NNEx utility function. The process may
be represented as NNEx → NZEx ↑ PPEx, and is clearly highly
discontinuous.
His other route to such an unlikely situation under the
PPEx utility function is to move seamlessly from the NNEx
utility function to the NZEx utility function when yki = xki, and
then transfer effortlessly but discontinuously to the PZEx util-
ity function, bringing a huge gain in utility once more:  a step
from –1.0 to +1.0. Only after this discontinuity can a smooth,
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subsequent move be effected into the region of the PPEx
utility function, where yki < xki. The process may be repre-
sented as NNEx → NZEx ↑ PZEx → PPEx and is again highly
discontinuous.
Whichever route is chosen, moving from the NNEx utility
function to the PPEx utility function must involve a discontin-
uous leap in utility.
So considering the case where the default utility function is
the NNEx, even though the NPEx utility function and the PPEx
utility function give the same marginal rate of substitution of
non-injury probability in place of wealth, mki, the NPEx util-
ity function has a better claim to validity than the PPEx utility
function, since it involves only incremental changes in utility
in the transfer from the region governed by the NNEx util-
ity function to that where the NPEx utility function operates.
By contrast moving to the PPEx utility function must bring a
discontinuous leap in utility.
A similar argument holds for the suggestion that a Linear
utility function should be used for results presented under
the heading of the NNEx utility function when MAC = MAP:
yki = xki ⇒ cki = 1. The Linear utility function is a limiting case
of the Power utility function when risk-aversion, εi, is set to
zero in Eq. (1). Allowing for a positive linear transformation, it
may be written
Ui (wi) = giwi + hi gi > 0 (47)
Assuming that the person’s starting behaviour, with
yki > xki, is modelled reasonably by a NNEx utility function,
it is natural to assume that, when he moves to yki = xki, his
behaviour will be modelled by a NZEx utility function, so that
his utility of wealth drops slightly. The process may be rep-
resented as NNEx → NZEx and is continuous. But switching
from an NNEx to a Linear utility function will in almost all
cases introduce a discontinuity in utility at the point where
yki = xki.
The only case where such a discontinuity will be avoided
is when
hi = − (giwi + 1) (48)
Now the utility of wealth under the Linear utility function
will match the utility under the NZEx, namely –1, as may be
seen by substituting Eq. (48) into Eq. (47), giving hi = − (giwi + 1)
for all wi, an equation that will be seen to be identical to Eq.
(24) that deﬁnes the NZEx utility function.
It can be shown by substituting Eq. (47) into Eq. (A.9) that the
injury offset under the Linear utility function will be ai = gixki.
Since, dUi/dwi = gi, it follows from Eq. (A.10) that mki = xki. Thus
the Linear utility function gives the same marginal rate of sub-
stitution of non-injury probability in place of wealth, mki, as
the NZEx utility function. However it will offer the same seam-
less change in utility in the transfer from the region where the
NNEx utility function is valid only when it is forced via the
constraint of equation (48) to mimic  exactly the behaviour of
the NZEx utility function: it has turned into the NZEx utility
function.
It may be concluded that the PPEx utility function is less
valid than the NPEx utility function and that the Linear util-
ity function has to be forced into the form of the NZEx utility
function to attain the same validity as the NZEx utility func-
tion.
But are the preferred utility functions just discussed, NZEx
and NPEx, themselves valid? Criticisms were made in Thomas
and Vaughan (2015b) of the two utility functions on the basis
that they assume respondents who are either anti-materialist
or at least indifferent to wealth. Moreover, the NZEx and the
NPEx utility functions imply either risk-neutral or risk-seeking
decision making, and it is difﬁcult to believe that large num-
bers of the population would adopt anything other than a
risk-averse stance when taking decisions on safety, speciﬁ-
cally in the Carthy study on two serious injuries, involving
hospitalisation and a recovery period of 3–4 months in the one
case and fully 18 months in the other. Indeed such a stipula-
tion on risk-aversion is included in Section 1 of Carthy et al.
(1999), where it is required that the individual
“is ﬁnancially risk-averse so that (∀w) U′ (w) > 0, U′′ (w) < 0
where U′′ (w) denotes the second derivative of U (.)”
Substituting the mathematical conditions just listed into
Eq. (2) shows that the individual’s risk-aversion, εi, is positive.
The statement above by the Carthy authors is thus equivalent
to the requirement that the individual’s risk-aversion should
be positive: εi > 0. (Both the PPEx and the Linear utility func-
tions are, of course, inconsistent with this condition).
The Exponential utility functions, NPEx and NZEx, par-
allel the behaviour of the Constrained Power utility when
MAC < MAP (Thomas and Vaughan, 2015a, Section 5.4) in the
following respect. In being forced to model risk-neutral (εi = 0)
or risk-seeking behaviour (εi < 0), the Exponential utility func-
tion is pushed beyond its region of applicability to safety
decisions. The conclusion here must be the same as for the
Constrained Power utility function in such circumstances,
namely that the results generated by the NPEx and NZEx utility
functions should not be regarded as reliable.
Since the PPEx and Linear utility functions have less valid-
ity than the NPEx and NZEx utility functions in modelling
the individual’s safety decision making, it follows that results
from the PPEx and Linear utility functions discussed by Jones-
Lee and Loomes (2015) cannot be relied upon and should not
be used.
7.  Joining  utility  functions  to  model  an
individual’s  utility  of  wealth
The Exponential utility functions discussed in Sections 3 and 4
above are deﬁned fully, so that it is possible to deduce the indi-
vidual’s utility of wealth for all possible wealths in the range:
wi : 0 ≤ wi < ∞ as soon as ˇi is found, for example from Eq. (14)
above. In particular, no arbitrary wealth threshold, ˇ(i), is sub-
tracted from the individual’s wealth before applying the utility
function. This was the stance adopted by Carthy et al. (1999)
when they applied the Negative Exponential utility function.
Consistency across the 4 utility functions used in the Carthy
study (Constrained Power, Logarithmic, Negative Inverse and
Negative Exponential) would seem to imply that any wealth
threshold must be zero: ˇ(i) = 0, as explained in Thomas and
Vaughan, 2015b. However Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015) have
now made it clear that they fully intended to introduce a posi-
tive wealth threshold, ˇ(i) > 0, of indeterminate size into their
speciﬁcation of the Constrained Power, Logarithmic and Neg-
ative Inverse utility functions. (For reference, the formulae for
these utility functions with a wealth threshold, ˇ(i), included
are given in Section 7.1, Eq. (49), Section 7.2, Eq. (55) and Sec-
tion 7.3, Eq. (57) respectively.)
In fact, the results for VPF will be independent of ˇ(i), and
so it is not surprising that the same results were derived in
Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) after setting ˇ(i) = 0 as found by
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Carthy et al. (1999), who apparently assumed a positive but
otherwise unspeciﬁed value for the wealth threshold, ˇ(i). Par-
alleling the case with the two groups of Exponential utility
functions discussed in Section 6, Negative and Positive, there
is no way of deducing from the inputs, MAP,  xki, and MAC,  yki,
and the output, mki, whether the utility function employed a
wealth threshold or none.
Setting ˇ(i) = 0 would appear to be the most natural way
of modelling human appreciation of wealth, since the utility
function will then apply to any non-negative value of wealth,
meaning that the individual will place some value on his
wealth even if it is very low. However, the intention of Jones-
Lee and Loomes (2015) is that ˇ(i) should be regarded as a
non-negative parameter subject only to the proviso that its
size should allow the computation of the utility of wealth for
a wealth of wi0 − ˇ(i) − xki. Thus for the Constrained Power util-
ity function it is required that wi0 − ˇ(i) − xki ≥ 0, leading to
the closed limits on ˇ(i): 0 ≤ ˇ(i) ≤ wi0 − xki. The impossibility
of computing the utility of zero wealth under the Logarith-
mic  and Negative Inverse utility functions, on the other hand,
means that for these utility functions the upper limit is open:
0 ≤ ˇ(i) < wi0 − xki.
The effect of any positive wealth threshold, ˇ(i) > 0 is to
limit the application of the Constrained Power to wealths
wi ≥ ˇ(i) and leave the individual’s utility undeﬁned for 0 ≤
wi < ˇ
(i). Similarly the Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility
functions will apply only to wealths wi > ˇ(i) and leave the indi-
vidual’s utility undeﬁned for 0 ≤ wi ≤ ˇ(i). But Jones-Lee and
Loomes (2015) wish to counter the charge of lack of deﬁnition
at and below wi = ˇ(i), and now suggest that a second utility
function of a different type could be used to cover the region
below the individual’s wealth threshold, ˇ(i). It will be shown
that this is an unrealistic strategy for the Constrained Power
utility function and an impossible strategy for the other two.
The case when the Constrained Power constitutes the main
utility function under consideration, for convenience named
here “the ﬁrst utility function”, is explored in the next subsec-
tion.
7.1.  The  ﬁrst  utility  function  is  the  Constrained  Power
utility  function
The properties of the Constrained Power utility are derived in
detail in Appendix B. Allowing for a wealth threshold, ˇ(i), and
choosing gi = 1 and hi = 0, the ﬁrst utility function has the form:
U1i (wi) =
(
wi − ˇ(i)
)1−εi wi ≥ ˇ(i) (49)
Now let us assume that the second utility function that is
to be joined to it is Logarithmic:
U2i (wi) = gi ln wi + hi 0 < wi ≤ ˇ(i); gi > 0 (50)
The retention of the parameters, gi and hi, conforms to the
implication from Jones-Lee and Loomes that the ﬂexibility of
the positive linear transformation should be used to allow the
second utility function, valid over 0 < wi ≤ ˇ(i), to match the
ﬁrst utility function, valid for wi ≥ ˇ(i), at the cross-over point,
wi = ˇ(i). Matching the two utilities at the cross-over wealth
requires that:
hi = −gi ln ˇ(i) (51)
Fig. 5 – Joining a Logarithmic utility function to a
Constrained Power utility function. ˇ(i) =£ 5000.
Take the example of Respondent 119 in the Carthy study,
who set his MAP, xXi, to avert injury X as xXi = £7, 500 and his
MAC, yXi, for enduring injury X as yXi = £25, 000 so that, from Eq.
(B.10), εi = 1 − ln 2ln(1+yXi/xXi) = 0.5273. For the purposes of illustra-
tion assume that ˇ(i) =£ 5, 000 (the precise value will not affect
the argument). Selecting gi = 20 for example (again the precise
value will not affect the argument), Eq. (51) yields hi = −170.3.
Fig. 5 shows the resulting combined utility function, and the
join is very obvious, with a sudden, enormous increase in the
individual’s utility of wealth at wi = ˇ(i). But what mechanism
could be at work to generate such a huge increase in utility at
some mid-range wealth, ˇ(i)?
In fact, in introducing the concept of utility, Daniel
Bernoulli (1738) considered a similar problem:
“though a poor man  generally obtains more  utility than
does a rich man  from an equal gain, it is nevertheless con-
ceivable, for example, that a rich prisoner who  possesses
two thousand ducats but needs two thousand ducats more
to repurchase his freedom, will place a higher value on a
gain of two thousand ducats than does another man  who
has less money than he.”
and we might comment that he would value a wealth of 4000
ducats hugely more  than 3999. But we believe that Bernoulli’s
answer remains valid:
“Though innumerable examples of this kind may be con-
structed, they represent exceedingly rare exceptions. We
shall, therefore, do better to consider what usually hap-
pens.”
Viewed in this light, the pronounced kink is obviously a
distortion of the normal run of things. However, it is unavoid-
able under the proposition of Jones-Lee and Loomes because,
although we can make U1i (wi) = U2i (wi) at wi = ˇ(i), the ﬁrst
derivatives cannot match. For, in the case when the 1st utility
function is of the Constrained Power type and the second is of
Logarithmic form:
dU2i
dwi
= gi
wi
→ gi
ˇ(i)
as wi → ˇ(i) (52)
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but
dU1i
dwi
= 1 − εi(
wi − ˇ(i)
)εi → ∞ as wi → ˇ(i) (53)
It is clearly impossible for the second utility function to
match the inﬁnite slope of the ﬁrst utility function at wi = ˇ(i)
whatever ﬁnite value of gi is chosen. The same problem will
occur if the second utility function is either the Negative
Inverse, when dU2i/dwi = gi/
(
ˇ(i)
)2
, or the NNEx: dU2i/dwi =
giˇie
−ˇiˇ(i) , or even another Constrained Power: dU2i/dwi =
gi (1 − εi) /
(
ˇ(i)
)εi . None of these derivatives can match the
inﬁnite slope of the ﬁrst utility function at wi = ˇ(i). The dis-
torting kink will thus occur for any wealth threshold apart
from ˇ(i) = 0.
The presence of the kink incorporating an inﬁnite slope at
the wealth threshold means that the utility of wealth below
that threshold cannot be deﬁned by any conventional utility
function and so must remain undeﬁned. Unless the wealth
threshold is zero, or very close (at, for example, the “quantum
of wealth”, a low value, estimated at between £1 and £5 in
Thomas et al. (2010d)), the sudden increase in utility of wealth
at some positive wealth calls into question the validity of any
ﬁrst utility function that allows for a wealth threshold, ˇ(i),
other than zero or negligibly small.
Thus, despite the limited degree of matching achieved
through Eq. (51), the process of joining two utility functions as
suggested by Jones-Lee and Loomes will always produce a glar-
ing anomaly when the ﬁrst utility function is a Constrained
Power. It is clear that the combined utility function cannot
then be regarded as a reasonable representation of human
preferences.
The only valid value of ˇ(i) emerges as that which can
remove the distorting kink, namely ˇ(i) = 0. Hence in Eq. (B.6) of
Appendix B, the wealth difference, wi0 − ˇ(i), is transformed
into the wealth: wi0 = wi0. This allows the individual’s start-
ing wealth, wi0, to be found in the manner described in
Thomas and Vaughan (2015a), namely wi0 = xki, k = W,  X (Eq.
(B.11) of Appendix B).
Another perspective is offered if the view is taken that the
general shape of the combined utility function of Fig. 5 would
be roughly correct provided the distorting kink were removed.
It is in fact possible to ﬁt the utility function
Ui (wi) = 1.585w1−εii − 78.04 wi ≥ 0; εi = 0.5273 (54)
which takes out the kink and provides the reasonably good
match shown in Fig. 6.
The utility function of Eq. (54) has a wealth threshold of
zero, and so wi0 = wi0 = xki. Thus, for example, the wealth
of Respondent 119 is £7500 under injury X, the ﬁgure found
previously by applying the Constrained Power utility function
as in Thomas and Vaughan (2015a).
7.2.  The  ﬁrst  utility  function  is  the  Logarithmic  utility
function
The ﬁrst utility function now takes has the form:
U1i (wi) = ln
(
wi − ˇ(i)
)
wi > ˇ
(i) (55)
Fig. 6 – Fitting a single Constrained Power to the two utility
functions.
However, any attempt to ﬁt a contiguous second util-
ity function, U2i (wi),  to cover the region 0 < wi ≤ ˇ(i), with
U2i
(
ˇ(i)
)
= U1i
(
ˇ(i)
)
, is doomed to failure, as
U1i (wi) = ln
(
wi − ˇ(i)
)
→ −∞ as wi → ˇ(i) (56)
It is impossible to ﬁnd a second utility function of any ﬁnite
form that will ﬁt underneath the ﬁrst utility function when
the ﬁrst utility function is Logarithmic. Fig. 7 illustrates this
insuperable problem.
7.3.  The  ﬁrst  utility  function  is  the  Negative  Inverse
utility function
The ﬁrst utility function now takes has the form:
U1i (wi) = −
1
wi − ˇ(i)
wi > ˇ
(i) (57)
Once again any attempt to ﬁt a contiguous second util-
ity function, U2i (wi),  to cover the region 0 < wi ≤ ˇ(i), with
U2i
(
ˇ(i)
)
= U1i
(
ˇ(i)
)
, is doomed to failure, as
U1i (wi) = −
1
wi − ˇ(i)
→ −∞ as wi → ˇ(i) (58)
Fig. 7 – Logarithmic utility of wealth for ˇ(i) =£ 5000.
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Fig. 8 – Negative Inverse utility of wealth for ˇ(i) =£ 5000.
As with the Logarithmic, it is impossible to ﬁnd a sec-
ond utility function of any ﬁnite form that will ﬁt underneath
the ﬁrst utility function when the ﬁrst utility function is the
Inverse Negative. Fig. 8 illustrates the point.
7.4.  General  problems  with  joining  utility  functions
It is understandable that the ﬁrst increments of wealth just
above zero should be valued very highly, providing a secure
basis for ensuring the fundamentals of life are met. However,
it appears reasonable to assume that subsequent increments
would be valued less. This situation, which occurs when the
wealth threshold is zero, is fully explicable on the basis of
economics and common sense.
By comparison, any generally applicable model whereby
the utility the individual derives from his wealth should
increase dramatically at some wealth, ˇ(i), must be regarded
as unrealistic. Even without the detailed mathematical con-
ﬁrmation presented above, it is clear that there is no realistic
possibility, except perhaps in special circumstances, of join-
ing two  utility functions for wealth in the way suggested by
Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015). The sharp and discontinuous
rise in the utility of wealth calculated by the 1st utility func-
tion at the wealth threshold can be characteristic only of the
very ﬁrst increment of wealth not a mid-range wealth. We  may
conclude that a positive wealth threshold will lead to a utility
that is undeﬁned below the wealth threshold and unrealistic
above it.
It is notable that when the ﬁrst utility function is either
Logarithmic or Negative Inverse (Sections 7.2 and 7.3), the indi-
vidual with a positive wealth threshold, ˇ(i), must be unmoved
by any change in his wealth below this level, since his utility
must at all times be less than or equal to minus  inﬁnity. Thus
his assets may double in value but he will be indifferent to this
good fortune if his resultant wealth stays below the threshold.
Such a situation can be a fair model of reality only when the
threshold is set at the “quantum of wealth”, which has been
estimated to be of the order of £1.
Using a single utility function in the way shown in Fig. 6, for
example, avoids the unrepresentative kink and offers the best
chance of mirroring reality and coping with the full range of
wealths that a person might need to evaluate. But, of course,
this approach implies ˇ(i) = 0.
The arguments above make it clear that introducing an
incompletely deﬁned wealth threshold, ˇ(i) > 0, into the utility
function brings insuperable problems for the notion that the
utility of the individual’s wealth below ˇ(i) can be deﬁned by
another utility function operating over 0 < wi < ˇ(i).
As noted above, the value wealth threshold, ˇ(i), makes
no difference to the calculation of the marginal rate of sub-
stitution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of wealth,
where mki is an intermediate parameter in the calculation of
the VPF using the two-injury chained model. So the ques-
tion arises, what purpose does it serve to introduce such
an extra parameter? It is also relevant to question why
such a parameter introduced into the model should be left
undeﬁned, or at least free to range over a potentially large
interval. If it was important to the Carthy study, why were
the respondents not asked the value they would put on
it?
It might be thought that the action of specifying that
some positive wealth threshold, ˇ(i), should exist for each
individual but at the same time leaving it incompletely spec-
iﬁed, might prevent what Chilton et al. (2015) and Jones-Lee
and Loomes (2015) describe as the “ridiculously low levels”
of implied wealth for the respondents in the Carthy study
becoming apparent. But this is not the case, as will now be
shown.
8.  The  average  wealth  of  the  respondents
when  it  is  assumed  that  there  is  some  positive
wealth  threshold
Although it has been shown untenable in the previous section,
let us assume purely for the sake of argument and illustration
that a strictly positive and non-negligible wealth threshold,
ˇ(i), can exist, as proposed by Jones-Lee and Loomes. The
effect of a non-zero wealth threshold will be considered for
each of the three utility functions used in Carthy et al. (1999)
that embody a predictive capability for the individual’s wealth,
namely the Constrained Power, the Logarithmic and the Neg-
ative Inverse. (The Negative Exponential utility function, also
used in the Carthy study, is exceptional in this regard, in that
the individual’s wealth cannot be inferred from his MAP  and
MAC values.)
8.1.  Constrained  Power  utility  function
When a wealth threshold is included, the Constrained Power
utility function will take the form:
Ui (wi) = w1−εii = wsii (59)
where wi is the individual’s wealth less his supposed wealth
threshold:
wi = wi − ˇ(i) 0 ≤ ˇ(i) ≤ wi0 − xki (60)
with the constraint on ˇ(i) appended to Eq. (60) reﬂecting the
computability requirement of Eq. (59) for non-integer si = 1 − εi.
The assumption inherent in the Constrained Power utility
function is that the injury offset will take its maximum per-
missible value, which, as shown in Appendix B, will occur
when
wi0 = xki k = W,  X (B.6)
Since the wealth threshold ˇ(i) lies in the interval: 0 ≤ ˇ(i) ≤
wi0 − xki, it may be represented by:
ˇ(i) = i (wi0 − xki) 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 (61)
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Combining Eqs. (60), (61) and (B.6) gives
wi0 − i (wi0 − xki) = xki (62)
or
(1 − i)wi0 = (1  − i) xki (63)
so that
wi0 = xki (64)
for any i : 0 ≤ i < 1 and hence for any ˇ(i) : 0 ≤ ˇ(i) < wi0 − xki. It
may be seen that Eq. (64) yields the same result for the individ-
ual’s wealth as given in Thomas and Vaughan (2015a), where
it was assumed, on the grounds of consistency, that ˇ(i) = 0.
Thus the results for the implied wealth of the respondents
given in Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) under the Constrained
Power utility function remain the same. Hence the aver-
age wealths calculated for the respondents will also stay
unchanged: £5252 under injury X and £1730 under injury W,
compared with the UK average of £78,300 at the time of the
survey (Matheson and Summerﬁeld, 2000). As Jones-Lee and
Loomes themselves admit, the implied wealths are “absurdly
low”  (Jones-Lee and Loomes, 2015).
There should not, of course, be one average value for injury
W and a different average for injury X, with the two estimates
differing by a factor of three. They should be the same. This
failing constitutes another major problem for the Carthy study,
sufﬁcient on its own to invalidate the Carthy results.
The very low value of average respondent wealth embod-
ied in these results from the two-injury chained method is
unaffected by the introduction of a wealth threshold. These
“absurdly low”  values may be explained in one of 3 ways:
(i) the selection of respondents failed to cover the full range
of wealth as required, but was biased towards those with
the lowest wealths, or
(ii) the selection was fair but the method gives incorrect
answers, or
(iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii).
Whichever way, it is possible to conclude that the VPF aris-
ing from the two-injury chained method is unsubstantiated.
Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015) claim that the choice of
respondents was “broadly representative” based on the col-
lected “demographic data concerning income, age and social
class”. From this we might conclude that it is the method is at
fault. But we  also learn that it will never be possible to compare
the predicted and actual wealths for the Carthy study. This is
because, while they gathered information on the respondents’
incomes, presumably by asking them directly or getting oth-
ers to do so, the Carthy authors made no attempt to ﬁnd the
individuals’ wealths that are key to justifying any VPF ﬁgure:
“we certainly did not have the temerity to question respon-
dents about their overall wealth”
We  will therefore never know whether the method or the
data were at fault, but the fact that other failings have been
identiﬁed in the methodology suggests that the method itself
represents a signiﬁcant source of error.
8.2.  Logarithmic  utility  function
If, as proposed by Jones-Lee and Loomes, a non-zero wealth
threshold, ˇ(i), can exist, then the Logarithmic utility function
becomes:
Ui (wi) = ln wi (65)
Eq. (65) replaces Eq. (B.13) of Thomas and Vaughan (2015a),
derived from Bernoulli (1738). Applying Eq. (65) to Eq. (A.8) then
produces
ln (wi0 − xki) + ln (wi0 + yki) = 2 ln (wi0) (66)
which implies
wi0 =
xkiyki
yki − xki
(67)
where
wi0 = wi0 − ˇ(i) 0 ≤ ˇ(i) < wi0 − xki (68)
The constraint on wealth threshold, ˇ(i), reﬂects the com-
putability requirements of Eq. (65). Since it lies in the
semi-closed range: 0 ≤ ˇ(i) < wi0 − xki, ˇ(i) may be represented
by:
ˇ(i) = i (wi0 − xki) 0 ≤ i < 1 (69)
Combining Eqs. (67), (68) and (69) gives
wi0 − i (wi0 − xki) =
xkiyki
yki − xki
(70)
which may be re-arranged to
wi0 (1 − i) =
xkiyki
yki − xki
− ixki = (1 − i)
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ i
x2
ki
yki − xki
(71)
Hence
wi0 =
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ i
1 − i
x2
ki
yki − xki
= xkiyki
yki − xki
+ mi
x2
ki
yki − xki
(72)
where mi is the ratio of i to its complement, 1 − i:
mi =
i
1 − i
(73)
The proposition of Jones-Lee and Loomes is that the wealth
threshold, ˇ(i), lies within a range but is otherwise unknown.
This makes it reasonable to model it as a random variable
distributed over its allowable range: 0 ≤ ˇ(i) < wi0 − xki, which
may be achieved by taking i to be random over the range 0 to
1: 0 ≤ i < 1. This requires that mi and wi0 should be replaced
by the random variables, Mi and Wi0, so that:
Wi0 =
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ Mi
x2
ki
yki − xki
(74)
where,
Mi = mi (i) (75)
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Fig. 9 – Probability density, f (i).
Importantly, the expected starting value of the wealth,
E (Wi0), of respondent i may be found by applying the expec-
tation operator to Eq. (74):
E (Wi0) =
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ x
2
ki
yki − xki
E (Mi) (76)
With nothing more  than its range to go on, a ﬁrst thought
might be to model i as uniform over 0 ≤ i < 1, but the term,
1 − i, in the denominator of Eq. (73) would mean that mi→ ∞
as i → 1, making E (Mi) inﬁnite also. The impossibility of inﬁ-
nite wealth rules out the uniform distribution as a model for
the behaviour of i, but a quasi-uniform distribution may be
retained, whereby the probability density, f (i),  is uniform
up to some point, i = a, with the probability density then
decreasing linearly to zero as i → 1:
f (i) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2
1 + a for 0 ≤ i ≤ a
2
1 − 2a
(1 − i) for a ≤ i < 1.0
(77)
Setting a = 0.99 means that the probability distribution for
the wealth threshold, ˇ(i), is uniform as far as 99% of its max-
imum possible value, after which it reduces linearly to zero
over the ﬁnal 1% of values. See Fig. 9.
The procedure for ﬁnding E (Mi) is given in Appendix C
and at a = 0.99 produces a value of E (Mi) = 4.63. This allows
the expected wealth, E (Wi0), to be found for each respon-
dent, using Eq. (76). The average, W¯0, of the expected starting
wealths, E (Wi0), may then be found by summing the expected
wealths of all respondents and dividing by their number. The
expected average wealth, E
(
W¯0
)
, amongst all the Ns respon-
dents in the sample is found by applying the expectation
operator, which will yield the same value:
E
(
W¯0
)
= 1
Ns
Ns∑
i=1
E (Wi0) (78)
8.3.  Negative  Inverse  utility  function
Under the proposition of Jones-Lee and Loomes that a non-
zero wealth threshold, ˇ(i), can exist, the new equation
deﬁning the Negative Inverse utility function is
Ui (wi) = −
1
wi
(79)
where, wi = wi − ˇ(i). Applying Eq. (79) to Eq. (A.8) then
produces
− 1
wi0 − xki
− 1
wi0 + yki
= − 2
wi0
(80)
which implies
wi0 =
2xkiyki
yki − xki
(81)
Representing the wealth threshold ˇ(i) by Eq. (69) as before,
combining Eqs. (69), (80) and (81) gives
wi0 − i (wi0 − xki) =
2xkiyki
yki − xki
(82)
which may be re-arranged to
wi0 (1 − i) =
2xkiyki
yki − xki
− ixki = (2  − i)
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ i
x2
ki
yki − xki
(83)
Hence
wi0 =
2 − i
1 − i
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ i
1 − i
x2
ki
yki − xki
(84)
But
2 − i
1 − i
= 2  − i − i + i
1 − i
= 21 − i
1 − i
+ i
1 − i
= 2 + mi (85)
where Eq. (73) has been used in the last step. Hence
wi0 = (2 + mi)
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ mi
x2
ki
yki − xki
= 2 xkiyki
yki − xki
+ mi
(
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ x
2
ki
yki − xki
) (86)
Proceeding as before, assume that i is random, so that:
Wi0 = 2
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ Mi
(
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ x
2
ki
yki − xki
)
(87)
while
E (Wi0) = 2
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ E (Mi)
(
xkiyki
yki − xki
+ x
2
ki
yki − xki
)
(88)
Using Eq. (88) in Eq. (78) then gives the expected average
wealth under the Negative Inverse utility function.
8.4.  Results  on  apparent  wealth  of  respondents
The results for the three utility functions are given in Table 2,
using data listed in the document “Individual Responses &
VOSLS–PEG Study”, HSE/Peg/Nov 1997/SC, with zero and neg-
ative wealths excluded. The average wealths are found for
the Constrained Power utility function and are, of course,
the low values reported previously in Thomas and Vaughan
(2015a). Meanwhile the random variable model applied to both
the Logarithmic and the Negative Inverse utility functions
produces the expected average wealths listed. (The two  val-
ues per utility function represent the different values derived
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Table 2 – Respondents’ average wealth and expected
average wealth under the three utility functions:
Constrained Power, Logarithmic and Negative Inverse.
Average
wealth (£)
Expected
average
wealth (£)
Utility function Constrained
Power
Logarithmic Negative
Inverse
Injury X 5252 29,707 77,902
Injury W 1730 4811 14,703
depending on whether injury W is considered or injury X. As
noted previously, this represents a clear and obvious ﬂaw in
the two-injury chained method.)
While now one of the results (Negative Inverse, injury X)
comes close to the average wealth, £78,300, of a UK adult in
1997 (Matheson and Summerﬁeld, 2000), 5 out of the 6 ﬁgures
for average wealth/expected average wealth lie well below that
ﬁgure. Indeed, no reliance can be placed on the ﬁgure pro-
duced by the Negative Inverse utility function under injury X
as, under injury W,  it produces a sum that is 5 times less, when
the two values should be the same.
This variability continues as a further major and invali-
dating problem for any argument in favour of introducing a
wealth threshold. Common sense suggests that the predic-
tions for average wealth made by different methods for the
same sample population should come out the same or at least
close to each other. But, as illustrated in the linear graph of
Fig. 10, the predictions are very widely spread, between close
to zero assets and the average wealth of the UK adult. Modi-
fying the statistical model used to ﬁnd the expected average
values for the Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility func-
tions by allowing the uniform distribution to cover 99.9% or
99.999% of the possible range rather than 99% would merely
accentuate the spread, partly (but not solely) because the val-
ues coming from the Constrained Power utility function are
ﬁrmly anchored at £1730 and £5250.
So even if all the contrary evidence of Section 7 were to be
ignored and the proposition of an incompletely deﬁned wealth
1,000 10,00 0 100,00 0
Average/  expe cted  average  wea lth (£)
Constrained Power
Logarithmic
Negative Invers e
Fig. 10 – Line graph showing average wealth or expected
average wealth under the three utility functions:
Constrained Power, Logarithmic and Negative Inverse. (The
two points per utility function represent the different
values derived depending on whether injury W is
considered or injury X, indicating an obviously ﬂaw in the
two-injury chained method).
threshold were to be accepted, the gross variability of the ﬁg-
ures for predicted average wealth would be sufﬁcient in itself
to show that the results produced by the two-injury chained
method had been falsiﬁed in the sense described by Sir Karl
Popper (Popper, 1934).
The results of the Carthy study are, of course, additionally
invalidated by the low values of average wealth relative to the
actual UK average at the time, as derived under the three util-
ity functions: Constrained Power, Logarithmic and Negative
Inverse. It is notable that the very low levels of wealth found
under the Constrained Power utility function are unchanged
by the addition of a wealth threshold.
9.  Discussion  on  the  use  of  utility  functions
9.1.  The  duality  of  Exponential  utility  functions
As shown at the end of Section 4.1, the marginal rate of sub-
stitution of non-injury probability in place of wealth, mki, will
always be the same for the Positive Exponential utility func-
tion as for the Negative Exponential utility function for any
combination of MAP and MAC, (xki, yki).  Combining this fact
with the relationships between the ranges of the parameter,
cki = yki/xki, and the different categories of Exponential utility
functions shown in Table 1, it is clear that there are 3 pairs of
Exponential utility function that produce the same answer for
the marginal rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury probabil-
ity in place of wealth, wi, given the same MAP,  xki, and MAC,
yki. Thus it is impossible to distinguish between the result of
applying an NPEx utility function to ﬁnd mki from xki and yki
when xki > yki, as used by Thomas and Vaughan (2015a), and
the result of applying a PPEx utility function, as used by Jones-
Lee and Loomes (2015). In addition, the NZEx, the PZEx and the
Linear utility functions will give the same value of mki from xki
and yki at the point where xki = yki, so that it is again impossi-
ble to decide, based on the evidence of mki, xki and yki, which
utility function has been used.
The duality between the Negative Exponential and Positive
Exponential utility functions when they are used in the calcu-
lation of the marginal rate of substitution, mki, of wealth for
non-injury probability was, in fact, foreshadowed, at least in
part, by the Carthy authors, as explained in Section 5 above.
On the other hand, it is possible that Jones-Lee and Loomes
(2015) were not aware of the full degree of duality involved.
Appendix C explains its signiﬁcant extent.
For the avoidance of doubt, the same value for the marginal
rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of
wealth will be produced whether cases where cki ≤ 1 are calcu-
lated using the PPEx and Linear utility functions or the NPEx
and NZEx utility functions. The choice makes no difference to
the ultimate answer.
However, if the NNEx, the canonical form of the Negative
Exponential utility function, is chosen as the default utility
function, continuity of utility requires that the NZEx util-
ity function be chosen for the case when MAP = MAC,  and
cki = yki/xki = 1, rather than either the PZEx or Linear utility
functions. Similar grounds of continuity of utility apply for
the case when MAP > MAC, xki > yki, requiring that NPEx should
be chosen rather than the PPEx utility function discussed by
Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015).
But all the utility functions, NPEx, PPEx, NZEx, PZEx
and Linear, applicable when MAC is less than or equal to
MAP,  cki ≤ 1, indicate behaviour that is either risk-neutral
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or risk-seeking. This suggests that none will be a realistic
representation of a person’s decision making when he is
considering how much to spend on averting a fatality. A break-
down in the two-injury chained method is indicated, affecting
about 30% of the respondents in the Carthy study (under injury
X or injury W or both), as explained previously in Thomas and
Vaughan (2015a).
9.2.  The  proposition  that  two  utility  functions  may  be
joined  to  cover  wealths  less  than  the  wealth  threshold,  ˇ(i)
It is impossible, as shown above, to ﬁt a utility function below
either the Logarithmic or Negative Inverse utility functions
to cover wealths less than the wealth threshold, ˇ(i). More-
over, while it is possible to join a contiguous utility function
to a Constrained Power utility function with wealth thresh-
old, the exercise is rendered unworkable by the pronounced
kink that the procedure introduces when wealth is equal to
the wealth threshold. An inﬁnite slope in the utility function
now occurs, which is a distortion of reality. Aside from spe-
cial circumstances (e.g. Bernoulli’s wealthy prisoner), a sudden
and dramatic rise in the person’s utility occurring at this point
can be characteristic only of the ﬁrst increments of wealth
just above zero, when the individual’s wealth is providing a
secure basis for ensuring the fundamentals of life are met. It
goes against economics and common sense that much later
increments will acquire a dramatically higher value than those
preceding them.
Thus, despite the suggestion to the contrary of Jones-Lee
and Loomes, it is infeasible to provide coverage below the
wealth threshold by ﬁtting a second, auxiliary utility function
below a ﬁrst utility function that embodies a wealth threshold
when the ﬁrst utility function is one of: Constrained Power,
Logarithmic and Negative Inverse. Setting a wealth threshold
other than zero would result in utility being undeﬁned below
the wealth threshold and unrealistic above. Thus the applica-
tion of two utility functions to model utility above and below
a positive wealth threshold is ruled out unless the wealth
threshold is either zero or negligibly low. The use of a sin-
gle utility function emerges as the only realistic way of coping
with the full range of wealths that a person might need to
evaluate.
It needs to be borne in mind that, although Jones-Lee and
Loomes have clariﬁed that they assumed the existence of an
incompletely speciﬁed positive wealth threshold, its presence
or absence makes no difference to the calculated VPF results.
Including no wealth threshold in the utility function is,
of course, a fully respectable and, indeed, the conventional
approach to calculating utility, employed since the time of
Daniel Bernoulli (1738) and continuing to the present day (U.K.
Treasury, 2011). So, irrespective of whether or not Jones-Lee
and Loomes employed a positive wealth threshold, there is no
reason why the MAP  and MAC data of the Carthy study should
not be interpreted using conventional utility functions with a
wealth threshold of zero. Not only does this entirely reputable
and usual approach allow all the Carthy study’s results on VPF
to be reproduced, it also allows the wealth of each respondent
to be deduced for each of the Constrained Power, the Loga-
rithmic and the Negative Inverse utility functions. The very
low average wealths reported in Thomas and Vaughan (2015a)
that result stand as deductions that are entirely legitimate on
this basis, irrespective of the arguments for a positive wealth
threshold put forward by Jones-Lee and Loomes, arguments
that have been shown in any case to be unsustainable.
9.3.  Implications  for  calculating  respondents’  wealth
when an  incompletely  speciﬁed  wealth  threshold  is
included
But what happens to the calculations of respondents’ wealth
if, despite the arguments against it, an incompletely speciﬁed
positive wealth threshold is nevertheless included in the util-
ity function? The analysis of Section 8 shows that the results
given in Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) are entirely unchanged
for the Constrained Power utility function. The implied lev-
els of wealth described by Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015) as
“ridiculously low” and “absurdly low” remain just as they were
before. The average wealth of the respondents is still £5252
under injury X and £1730 under injury W,  ﬁgures that should
be compared with the UK average of £78,300 at the time.
A deterministic calculation is not possible in the case of
the Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility functions, but a
random variable analysis allows the expected average wealth
of the respondents to be estimated for the Carthy survey.
The model uses a quasi-uniform probability distribution giv-
ing equal weight to 99% of the possible range of the wealth
threshold, with a linearly decreasing probability distribution
for the ﬁnal 1%. This allows plausible estimates to be pro-
duced for the expected average wealth of the respondents for
both the Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility functions.
The spread between the wealth under injury W and injury
X widens markedly, but the very low values remain. While
one value approaches the national average, the other 3 ﬁgures
are 38%, 19% and 6% of that ﬁgure. Of course, all the values
for average or expected average wealth should come out the
same, but, as demonstrated in the line graph of Fig. 10, they
are widely separated.
The conclusion remains that one of the following three
options must apply:
•  the Carthy study failed to select respondents representing
the full range of wealths in the UK
• the selection was fair but the method employed gives incor-
rect answers
• the anomalous results arose from a combination of both the
factors listed above
The VPF produced is unsubstantiated whichever is the cor-
rect explanation.
10.  Conclusions
The VPF ﬁgure in use for the past 16 years in the UK rests
squarely on the value produced by the Carthy study. The cur-
rent authors have shown several deﬁciencies in the method
used by Carthy et al. in an earlier paper. The resulting
exchange of comments between ourselves and various mem-
bers of the team who worked on the Carthy study has not
led to satisfactory answers being provided to the concerns we
raised. The latest commentary from Jones-Lee and Loomes is
a spirited second defence of the Carthy study, but the points
they raise may be seen to be technical rather than fundamen-
tal, and they have, in any case, been rebutted in full. Hence
this second defence should not be used as an excuse for con-
tinuing to use a VPF ﬁgure that has been shown to be based
on a study that does not stand up to scrutiny.
We are pleased to have this opportunity to elucidate some
interesting features of utility functions and, indeed, some
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potential pitfalls in their application to the valuation of human
life. We  are, however, saddened that Loomes and Jones-Lee
seem in their second defence to adopt an ad hominem approach
in responding to our arguments and that they declare them-
selves unwilling to debate the issues further. We  have no
desire to take a similar line and are content to allow the logic
of our case to speak for itself.
The salient fact is that the VPF derived from the two-injury
chained method has been shown to be unsubstantiated and it
is wholly unsatisfactory that it should be used as a benchmark
for safety investment in the UK. We  stand by our previous con-
clusion (Thomas and Vaughan, 2015a) that there is a need for
active consideration of methods of valuing human life in the
UK that offer an alternative to stated preference techniques.
Ensuring that UK workers and public receive adequate pro-
tection from industrial and transport hazards means that a
re-appraisal is needed urgently of other statistical method-
ologies that can provide guidance to owners, operators and
regulators on decisions on safety.
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Appendix  A.  Relating  the  individual’s  starting
utility  of  wealth  to  his  utilities  after  paying  to
avert  the  injury  and  after  receiving
compensation  for  the  injury  suffered
As part of the two-injury chained method, individuals, i, are
invited to consider two injuries X and W,  and asked to estimate
the maximum acceptable price (MAP, £) they would pay to avert
the injury and the minimum acceptable compensation (MAC,
£) they would take as compensation for enduring the injury.
Let wi be the wealth of an individual, i, and Ui (wi) be his utility
of wealth when he is in good health. Now consider an injury,
k, that will reduce the individual’s utility of wealth to Iki (wi),
k  = W,  X. A simple model for the utility in the injured condition
is suggested in the Carthy study:
Iki (wi) = Ui (wi) − aki aki ≥ 0, k = W,  X (A.1)
where, aki may be termed the injury offset, particular to the
injury and to the individual.
The MAP  of individual i associated with injury k, xki, will be
reached when its payment will reduce the utility of the healthy
individual to the level he would experience without paying it
and suffering the injury in consequence. His wealth, wi, will
have fallen from its starting level, wi0, to
wi = wi0 − xki k = W,  X (A.2)
and thus his utility will be Ui (wi) = Ui (wi0 − xki). The MAP  will
correspond to the indifference point where his utility in good
health but having paid out xki equals his utility under injury
but with his original wealth:
Ui (wi0 − xki) = Iki (wi0) k = W,  X (A.3)
In an analogous way, the MAC,  yki, will be reached when the
utility of the injured person has risen by virtue of the increase
in wealth to the level it would have been in the absence of both
injury and compensation. His new wealth will be
w = wi0 + yki k = W,  X (A.4)
and his new utility, because he is injured, will be Iki (wi) =
Iki (wi0 + yki).  The MAC will occur at the indifference point
where
Ui (wi0) = Iki (wi0 + yki) k = W,  X (A.5)
Using Eq. (A.1) in Eqs. (A.3) and (A.5), we  achieve the equa-
tion pair applicable to individual, i, considering either injury
W or injury X:
Ui (wi0 − xki) = Ui (wi0) − aki k = W,  X (A.6)
Ui (wi0 + yki) −  aki = Ui (wi0) k = W,  X (A.7)
from which aki may be eliminated to give:
Ui (wi0 − xki) +  Ui (wi0 + yki) = 2Ui (wi0) k = W,  X (A.8)
The injury offset may then be found as:
aki = Ui (wi0) − Ui (wi0 − xki) k = W,  X (A.9)
Under the model used in the Carthy study, the marginal
rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of
wealth, wi, may then be found from (see Thomas and Vaughan,
2015a, Appendix A):
mki =
aki
dUi
dwi
∣∣∣
wi=wi0
k = W,  X (A.10)
Appendix  B.  Application  to  the  Constrained
Power  utility  function  with  wealth  threshold
and  subject  to  a  positive  linear  transformation
Allowing for a wealth threshold, ˇ(i), and a positive linear
transformation gives the utility of wealth, wi, for individual,
i, under the Constrained Power utility function:
Ui (wi) = gi
(
wi − ˇ(i)
)si + hi (B.1)
where, the exponent is the complement of the risk-aversion,
si = 1 − εi, and gi > 0. Substituting into Eq. (A.8) gives:
gi
(
wi0 − ˇ(i) − xki
)si + hi + gi(wi0 − ˇ(i) + yki)si
+ hi = 2gi
(
wi0 − ˇ(i)
)si + 2hi k = W,  X (B.2)
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Cancelling gi and hi and putting
wi0 = wi0 − ˇ(i) (B.3)
gives:
(wi0 − xki)si + (wi0 + yki)si = 2wsii0 k = W,  X (B.4)
Meanwhile substituting from Eq. (B.1) into Eq. (A.9) gives
the injury offset:
aki = gi
(
wi0 − ˇ(i)
)si + hi − gi(wi0 − ˇ(i) − xki)si − hi
= gi
(
w
si
i0 − (wi0 − xki)
si
) k = W,  X
(B.5)
The assumption behind the Constrained Power utility func-
tion is that the injury offset will take its maximum permissible
value, which, by inspection of Eq. (B.5), will occur when
wi0 = xki k = W,  X (B.6)
Differentiation of Eq. (B.1) with respect to wi gives:
dUi
dwi
= gisi
(
wi − ˇ(i)
)si−1 = gisiwsi−1i (B.7)
Substituting from Eqs. (B.5), (B.6) and (B.7) into Eq. (A.10)
then gives the marginal rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury
probability in place of wealth, wi, at wi = wi0 and hence wi =
wi0
mki =
w
si
i0 − (wi0 − xki)
si
siw
si−1
i0
= xki
si
k = W,  X (B.8)
Moreover substituting from Eq. (B.6) into Eq. (B.4) gives:
(xki + yki)si = 2xsiki k = W,  X (B.9)
Taking logs produces the following expression for the expo-
nent:
si =
ln 2
ln (1 + yki/xki)
= 1 − εi k = W,  X (B.10)
Note that Eqs. (B.6), (B.8) and (B.10) will hold whatever per-
missible values of gi, hi and ˇ(i) are used. An extra important
result deriving from the deﬁnition, wi0 = wi0 − ˇ(i), is that, if
ˇ(i) = 0, the individual’s starting wealth is determined from Eq.
(5):
wi0 = xki k = W,  X (B.11)
Appendix  C.  Further  equivalences  of  the
marginal  rate  of  substitution,  mki,  of  non-injury
probability  in  place  of  wealth
It has already been shown in Section 4.1 that the marginal rate
of substitution of non-injury probability in place of wealth, mki,
will be the same for the Positive Exponential utility function
as for the Negative Exponential utility function for any com-
bination of MAP  and MAC, (xki, yki). This Appendix will show
further equivalent expressions for the parameter, mki.
C.1.  Alternative  expression  for  mki for  the  Negative
Exponential  utility  function
Putting
dki =
xki
yki
(C.1)
allows Eq. (8) to be expanded in the alternative way to Eq. (10):
eˇiykidki + e−ˇiyki = e−ˇiyki + (eˇiyki )dki = 2 (C.2)
Putting
ki = e−ˇiyki (C.3)
and so
ˇi = −
ln ki
yki
(C.4)
allows Eq. (C.2) to be rewritten:
ki − 2 +
1

dki
ki
= 0 (C.5)
Comparing Eq. (C.5) with Eq. (12), it is clear that ki will be
the same function of dki as ki is of cki. Hence
ki = F (dki) = F
(
xki
yki
)
(C.6)
An alternative formulation for injury offset, aki, to that
given in Eq. (A.9) may be found from Eq. (A.7):
aki = Ui (wi0 + yki) − Ui (wi0) (C.7)
Substituting from the deﬁnition of a Negative Exponential
utility function of Eq. (3) then gives:
aki = −e−ˇi(wi0+yki) + e−ˇiwi0 = Ui (wi0) (e−ˇiyki − 1)
= Ui (wi0) (ki − 1) (C.8)
Meanwhile differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to wealth
gives:
dUi
dwi
= ˇie−ˇiwi = −ˇiUi =
ln ki
yki
Ui (C.9)
where, Eq. (C.4) has been used in the last step. Substituting
from Eqs. (C.7) and (C.8) into Eq. (A.10) then gives the marginal
rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of
wealth as:
mki =
ki − 1
ln ki
yki (C.10)
which is an alternative but equivalent form to Eq. (18). That
the two are equivalent follows from expanding Eq. (8) as:
eˇixki − 1 = − (e−ˇiyki − 1) (C.11)
so that, using Eqs. (11) and (C.3)
ki − 1 = − (ki − 1) (C.12)
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Dividing both sides of this equation by ˇi gives
ki − 1
ˇi
= − ki − 1
ˇi
(C.13)
Now substituting for ˇi from Eq. (14) into the left-hand side
and from Eq. (C.4) into the right-hand side of Eq. (C.12) gives
the desired result:
ki − 1
ln ki
xki =
ki − 1
ln ki
yki (C.14)
The expressions for mki in Eqs. (18) and (C.10) will thus give
the same result.
Eq. (C.10) may be rewritten using Eq. (C.6) as
mki =
F
(
xki
yki
)
− 1
ln F
(
xki
yki
) yki k = W,  X (C.15)
and compared with the expression previously derived as Eq.
(19), repeated below
mki =
F
(
yki
xki
)
− 1
ln F
(
yki
xki
) xki k = W,  X (19)
The two expressions will give the same result for every
pair of MAP  and MAC, (xki, yki). It may be observed that the
right-hand side of Eq. (19) may be converted into Eq. (C.15) by
replacing yki by xki and xki by yki.
C.2.  Alternative  expression  for  mki for  the  Positive
Exponential  utility  function
Using Eq. (C.1) allows Eq. (28) to be expanded in an alternative
way to Eq. (29):
e−ˇidkiyki + eˇiyki = eˇiyki + (e−ˇiyki )dki = 2 (C.16)
Put
ki = eˇiyki (C.17)
and so
ˇi =
ln ki
yki
(C.18)
Substituting from Eq. (C.17) into Eq. (C.16) then gives
ki − 2 +
1

dki
ki
= 0 (C.19)
Eq. (C.19) is of the same form in ki as Eq. (C.5) in ki, and so
we may write
ki = F (dki) = F
(
xki
yki
)
(C.20)
Substituting from the deﬁnition of a Positive Exponential
utility function of Eq. (5) into Eq. (C.7) for injury offset gives:
aki = eˇi(wi0+yki) − eˇiwi0 = Ui (wi0) (eˇiyki − 1) = Ui (wi0) (ki − 1)
(C.21)
Meanwhile differentiation of Eq. (5) gives:
dUi
dwi
= ˇieˇiwi = ˇiUi =
ln ki
yki
Ui (C.22)
where, Eq. (C.18) is used in the last step.
Substituting from Eqs. (C.21) and (C.22) into Eq. (A.10) then
gives the marginal rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury prob-
ability in place of wealth as:
mki =
ki − 1
ln ki
yki (C.23)
This is an alternative but equivalent form to Eq. (37), as can
be shown by expanding Eq. (28) as:
e−ˇixki − 1 = − (eˇiyki − 1) (C.24)
so that, using Eqs. (30) and (C.17)
 ki − 1 = − (ki − 1) (C.25)
Dividing both sides of this equation by ˇi gives
 ki − 1
ˇi
= −ki − 1
ˇi
(C.26)
Now substituting for ˇi from Eq. (33) into the left-hand side
and from Eq. (C.18) into the right-hand side of Eq. (C.26) gives
the desired result:
 ki − 1
ln  ki
xki =
ki − 1
ln ki
yki (C.27)
Eq. (C.23) may be rewritten using Eq. (C.20) as
mki =
F
(
xki
yki
)
− 1
ln F
(
xki
yki
) yki k = W,  X (C.28)
This may be compared with the expression previously
derived as Eq. (38), repeated below and just shown to be equiv-
alent:
mki =
F
(
yki
xki
)
− 1
ln F
(
yki
xki
) xki k = W,  X (38)
Eqs. (C.28) and (38) will give the same result for every pair
of MAP  and MAC, (xki, yki).
In the same way that Eq. (19) can be transformed into Eq.
(C.15) by replacing yki by xki and xki by yki, carrying out a similar
transformation on Eq. (38) will produce Eq. (C.28).
C.3.  Comparing  the  expressions  for  mki for  the  Positive
Exponential  and  Negative  Exponential  utility  functions
As noted in Section 5, Carthy et al. (1999) suggested that the
calculational method for ﬁnding the marginal rate of substi-
tution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of wealth used
under the Negative Exponential utility function could also be
employed to ﬁnd mki under the Positive Exponential utility
function by transposing xki and yki. They are correct in this
assessment, since replacing yki by xki and xki by  yki in Eq. (38)
will produce Eq. (C.28), and Eq. (C.28) for mki under the Posi-
tive Exponential utility function is identical to Eq. (C.15) for mki
under the Negative Exponential utility function. Moreover, Eq.
168  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 148–169
(C.15) has been found by replacing yki by xki and xki by yki in Eq.
(19).
However, the comments in Jones-Lee and Loomes (2015)
suggest that those authors do not seem to have appreciated
the more  general point that all four Eqs. (19), (C.15), (38) and
(C.28) will produce the same result for every pair of MAP and
MAC, (xki, yki). Hence in attempting to ﬁnd the marginal rate of
substitution, mki, of non-injury probability in place of wealth
under the Positive Exponential utility function, it is not nec-
essary to swap the places of yki and xki in the Eq., (19), that
gives mki under the Negative Exponential utility function. Eq.
(19) can be used directly. As shown in this Appendix, this is
a necessary consequence of the model used in the two-injury
chained method.
Appendix  D.  Finding  the  expected  value,  E(Mi),
of  the  ratio  of  i to  its  complement
The probability distribution, q (mi), for mi may be found as:
q (mi) = f (i (mi))
∣∣∣ di
dmi
∣∣∣ (D.1)
From Eq. (73),
i =
mi
mi + 1
(D.2)
and so:
di
dmi
= 1
(mi + 1)2
(D.3)
Meanwhile we may use Eq. (73) to deﬁne ma = mi (a):
ma = a1 − a (D.4)
After using Eq. (D.2) in Eq. (77), we may combine Eqs. (D.1),
(D.3) and (D.4) to give the probability distribution, q (mi),  as:
q (mi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
2
(1 + a) (mi + 1)2
for 0 < mi < ma
2(
1 − 2a
)
(mi + 1)3
for ma < mi ≤ ∞
(D.5)
The expected value, E (Mi),  may then be found as:
E (Mi) =
∞∫
mi=0
miq (mi)dmi
= 2
1 + a
ma∫
mi=0
mi
(mi + 1)2
dmi +
2
1 − 2a
∞∫
mi=ma
mi
(mi + 1)3
dmi
(D.6)
so that:
E (Mi) =
2
1 + a
(
1
mi + 1
+ ln (mi + 1)
)ma
0
+ 2
1 − 2a
(
− 2mi + 1
2(mi + 1)2
)∞
ma
(D.7)
Hence:
E (Mi) =
2
1 + a
(
1
ma + 1 + ln (ma + 1) − 1
)
+ 2
1 − 2a
(
2ma + 1
2(ma + 1)2
)
(D.8)
Setting, a = 0.99, it follows that ma = 99 and E (Mi) = 4.63.
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